

A Palestinian Renaissance: Establishing a Novel Political Structure Following Israel's Operation in Gaza

Dr. Shamaila Amir

Former Instructor, NUST, Karachi Campus, Karachi Pakistan.

shaminhasan@hotmail.com

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Abstract

The paper discusses the eruption of conflict between Israel and Hamas in October 2023, marking a significant escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hamas militants entered Gaza, launching attacks on Israeli cities and villages, resulting in casualties and captured individuals on both sides. Subsequent rocket exchanges intensified tensions, leading Israel to evacuate over a million Palestinians from northern Gaza in anticipation of a ground invasion. The ongoing fighting has claimed thousands of lives, including many children, and exacerbated shortages of essential resources in Gaza due to restricted aid access. The Biden administration advocates for the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and asserts commitment to a political process aiming for a two-state solution. The paper contemplates the potential for a Palestinian Renaissance and the establishment of a new political order post-conflict.

Keywords: Palestinian, revival, political order, Israel, assault, Gaza

Introduction

Israeli authorities maintain that their military assault will not stop until Hamas is destroyed, despite 10 weeks of a bloody battle in Gaza (Hakim et al., 2023). They still have not explained how it would work in reality or who or what they think would take up the governance gap that would result from it. Because there is no apparent finale, there has been a lot of speculation about what will happen once the bombs stop falling. The day-after possibilities have ranged from ludicrous concepts like Arab trusteeship over Gaza to highly disquieting calls, largely from Israelis, for the deportation of the bulk of Gaza's people to Egypt. The Palestinians will neither be forcibly displaced from Gaza nor will Israel reoccupy the region, according to the Biden administration's day-after guidelines. Furthermore, the administration has stated that it is in favour of the revitalized Palestinian Authority, which is the Palestinian entity that is ostensibly in charge of certain areas of the West Bank, returning to Gaza. In contrast to the last three years, the government now asserts that it is committed to a political process that, as part of the two-state solution, will result in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Literature Review

Following a week-long cease-fire in late November that saw frequent prisoner swaps and greater humanitarian supplies, Israel and Hamas' fighting resumed. On December 3, Israel announced that it had expanded its ground attack to cover the entire Gaza Strip and ordered more evacuations. This development indicates that there are no safe areas for the 2.3 million Gazans,

many of whom have already fled their homes, UN estimates say. Gaza and Khan Younis, two densely populated cities, have been heavily targeted by Israeli attacks. Reports suggest that Hamas has entrenched itself in these areas, often within civilian infrastructure, while Israeli airstrikes have caused significant damage to nearby infrastructure (Hakim et al., 2023; Cortellessa, 2023).

Only fifteen hospitals are operational, with twelve located in the southern region, due to the effects of raids and a scarcity of essential supplies (Al-Jazeera, 2023). The World Health Organization (WHO) has issued a warning about the spread of disease, alongside a rise in civilian casualties. Meanwhile, the United States is engaged in shuttle diplomacy as tensions in the region reach unprecedented levels. Israel is reportedly targeting Iranian-affiliated sites in Syria and continuing to launch missiles at Hezbollah positions in Lebanon (Magid & Agencies, 2023). Furthermore, terrorists backed by Iran have attacked US military installations in Syria and Iraq multiple times, while Houthi rebels in Yemen have launched missile attacks against Israel and commercial ships in the Red Sea (Gambrell, 2023).

The late nineteenth century marked the genesis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. UN Resolution 181, commonly referred to as the Partition Plan, was introduced in 1947 to divide the British Mandate of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (Gil, 1997). Following the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, the initial Arab-Israeli conflict commenced (Joronen & Griffiths, 2022). Despite emerging victorious in 1949, Israel compelled 750,000 Palestinians to flee their homes, leading to the division of the area into the Gaza Strip, the Jordan River Valley, and the State of Israel (Cohen et al., 2017; Hurewitz, 2022).

Tensions escalated over time, particularly between Syria, Egypt, and Israel. Following the 1956 Suez Crisis and Israel's entrance into the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria agreed to treaties of mutual defence in anticipation of a possible mobilization by the Israeli army (Bligh, 2014). In June 1967, Israel's preemptive strike against Syria's and Egypt's air forces in retaliation for drills led by Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser precipitated the Six-Day War. Subsequently, Israel was granted control over the Golan Heights in Syria, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in Jordan, and the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip in Egypt following the conflict (Gil, 1997).

The conflict was deemed successful by Egypt's president, Anwar al-Sadat (Cohen et al., 2017) since it made it possible for Syria and Egypt to hold talks over previously ceded territory. Six years later, to regain lost territory, Egypt and Syria unexpectedly launched a two-front attack on Israel, which became known as the Yom Kippur War or the October War (Waxman, 2023). The thirty-year battle between Egypt and Israel was finally resolved in 1979 when the presidents of both countries signed the Camp David Accords, a peace treaty, following several cease-fires and peace negotiations (Cattan, 2022; Joronen & Griffiths, 2022).

Israel's ties with its neighbours were improved by the Camp David Accords, but the question of Palestinian self-determination and self-governance remained unsolved. This continuous challenge was highlighted in 1987 with the start of the first intifada, which was spearheaded by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip against Israeli rule. Following this, the Oslo I Accords of 1993 established a framework for the West Bank and Gaza Strip's Palestinian self-governance, promoting mutual recognition between the Israeli government and the newly established Palestinian Authority. Building upon this foundation, the Oslo II Accords of 1995 extended the terms of the previous agreement, mandating Israel to evacuate 400 communities and six towns in the West Bank (Hakim et al., 2023; Gil, 1997; Hurewitz, 2022; Shlaim, 1994; Dowty, 2012).

The second intifada was started by Palestinians in 2000 and continued until 2005 (Matta & Rojas, 2016). It was partially triggered by Palestinian concerns about Israel's management of

the West Bank, an impasse in the peace process, and the visit of former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the al-Aqsa mosque, the third-holiest site in Islam. The International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice suspended Israel's approval of a wall partitioning the whole West Bank in 2002 as reprisal (Cohen et al., 2017).

Following Hamas's triumph against Fatah, the long-standing ruling party in the Palestinian Authority, in the 2006 parliamentary elections, factionalism among Palestinians became apparent (Jamal, 2013). This gave Hamas, a political and militant organization backed by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, control over the Gaza Strip (Cattan, 2022). The Palestinian Authority, a semi-autonomous administration, has ruled Gaza, a tiny Mediterranean island that borders Egypt in the south, since 1993. Since Hamas has been categorized as a terrorist organization by Western countries since the late 1990s (Dowty, 2012), the United States and the European Union, among others, have refused to recognize the group's election triumph (Hurewitz, 2022). After Hamas took control, violence broke out between it and Fatah. A ceasefire was established in 2011 following several fruitless peace negotiations and horrific combat. In 2014, Hamas and Fatah established a unity government (Cortellessa, 2023).

In the summer of 2014, hostilities in the Palestinian territories broke out, leading to a military confrontation between Israel and Hamas (Hussein, 2021). After Hamas retaliated by firing almost 3,000 missiles into Israel, the Israeli government launched a massive offensive in Gaza (Cohen et al., 2017). A cease-fire brokered by Egypt in late August 2014 brought an end to the fighting, but not before 2,251 Palestinians and 73 Israelis had died. Following a spike in violence between Israelis and Palestinians in 2015, Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas declared that the physical boundaries of the Oslo Accords would no longer apply to the Palestinian people (Dunne, 2023).

In March 2018, during an otherwise peaceful march, some Palestinians broke over the perimeter barrier separating Israel and the Gaza Strip and threw rocks, causing Israeli forces to open fire, killing 183 Palestinians and injuring 6,000 more (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). A few months later, during a 24-hour standoff, Hamas fired over 100 rockets into Israel, forcing Israel to retaliate by attacking over fifty sites in Gaza. A resurgence of backstabbing between the two parties has resulted from the hot political environment, with Hamas de facto controlling the Gaza Strip and Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah party controlling the Palestinian Authority from the West Bank (Barnes-Dacey & Hugh, 2023).

The Trump administration reversed decades of US policy by relocating the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and slashing funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency, which assists Palestinian refugees (BBC News, 2021). Furthermore, the Trump administration participated in the negotiation of the Abraham Accords, which allowed Bahrain and the UAE to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. These two nations, after Jordan in 1994 and Egypt in 1979, became the third and fourth in the region to achieve this. Further agreements were made with Morocco and Sudan. Both Hamas and Palestinian Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas rejected the deals (Cortellessa, 2023).

Early in May 2021, riots broke out in reaction to a court ruling that validated the eviction of many Palestinian families from their homes in East Jerusalem, with Israeli police using force to drive out protestors (Høvring, 2021). Following days of fierce fighting, Hamas, and other militant Palestinian groups launched hundreds of missiles into Israeli territory (Dunne, 2023). In retaliation, Over twenty Palestinians were killed and numerous civilian and military buildings, including residences, media outlets, refugee centres, and medical facilities, were destroyed by Israeli bombings and artillery bombardments. Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire and declared victory eleven days later. The conflict is said to have resulted in the deaths of about 250

Palestinians and at least 13 Israelis, as well as around 2,000 injuries and 72,000 Palestinian displacements (Høvring, 2021).

In December 2022, Netanyahu and his Likud party, two ultra-Orthodox parties, and three far-right parties formed the most extreme and religious administration in Israel (Al-Jazeera, 2022). The growth and development of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank were given top priority by the coalition government. President Biden issued a resounding declaration of support for Israel on October 7, 2023, following the start of hostilities between Israel and Hamas (Telhami, 2023). The same day that Israel declared war on Hamas, the United States declared that it would expand military assistance and move its navy ships closer to Israel in the Mediterranean Sea (Barnes-Dacey & Hugh, 2023). Even after calling an emergency meeting to discuss the recent violence, the members of the UN Security Council were unable to agree on a statement. Citing a history of cruelty in battles between Israel and Palestinian extremist groups, international organizations quickly expressed worries about the safety of people in Israel and the Palestinian territories, as well as those taken captive by terrorists in Gaza (Pappe, 2022; Karsh, 2010). About 1,300 Israelis and 10,000 Palestinians died in the first month of fighting; the conflict's rising death toll is the main cause for concern (Telhami, 2023).

Iran has a long history of patronage relations with both Hamas and other Middle Eastern groups (Christison, 2023), despite the US's claim that there was no concrete evidence that Iranian security and intelligence services had actively assisted Hamas in plotting its October 7 attack. There are concerns that the battle may go farther north because Israel has struck Syrian military installations and airports, Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran, and Israel trade artillery fire almost daily (Dunne, 2023; Cortellessa, 2023). Houthi militants in Yemen fired three missile rounds towards Israel from the south. In the meantime, a coalition of Iranian-backed militias known as the Islamic Resistance of Iraq has been blamed for hundreds of strikes against US military sites in Syria and Iraq (Jahanbani et al., 2023).

The US's attempt to arrange a 2023 normalisation agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia was derailed by the bloodshed in October (Pamuk, 2023). For as long as there has been an Arab Palestinian community in Israel, the West Bank, or Gaza, Saudi Arabia has fought for their rights and security. These populations, particularly those in Gaza, are now in the line of IDF operations, endangering the mutual understanding between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The United States claims that Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in the agreement (Yeranian, 2023).

The battle between Israel and Hamas, the militant Islamist organisation that has controlled Gaza since 2006, began in October 2023, marking the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's most catastrophic escalation in decades. Over 1,300 Israelis were killed, 3,300 injured, and hundreds more taken prisoner as Hamas fighters crossed the Gaza Strip to assault southern Israeli cities and villages and launch rockets into Israel. The invasion took Israel by surprise, but it did not hesitate to launch a deadly counteroffensive. After the events of October 7, the Israeli cabinet officially declared war on Hamas one day later. The minister of defence then ordered the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) to impose a total embargo on Gaza (Al-Jazeera, 2023).

Since then, the two sides have launched rocket attacks regularly. On October 28, Israel issued an order for the more than a million Palestinian residents of northern Gaza to evacuate in anticipation of a land invasion (Hendrix et al., 2023). With Israeli soldiers encircling Gaza City and isolating it from the rest of the region, Hamas is under pressure. There are still hundreds of thousands of residents in the city. 10,000 Palestinians, including over 4,000 children, have died in the war, according to Gaza health officials (CNN Staff, 2023). Due to Israel's rejection of humanitarian pauses and restrictions on the quantity of aid that may enter, the region is also chronically short on supplies, including petrol, water, and supplies.

Egypt and Jordan, who have previously taken in hundreds of thousands of Palestinians but have declined to take in any more during the present crisis, are put in a difficult situation by the movement of millions more Palestinians. Many Gazans were previously uprooted from other parts of Israel, so they fear that if they leave, they won't be able to return. Egypt is also worried that Hamas militants will enter the nation and battle Israel in the Sinai, or that they will overthrow Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's autocratic government by siding with the "Muslim Brotherhood" (Hamid, 2018). As a consequence of the agreements, more than 1,100 Palestinians have left Gaza and entered Egypt through the Rafah border crossing. 1.5 million Displaced Gazans, or 70% of the population, are stuck in Gaza with worsening living circumstances and security threats (Turak, 2023).

Research Methodology

The qualitative research method has been used to describe and analyze the available data. The data has been taken from secondary sources i.e. research papers, journal articles, newspapers, books etc. All this data has been taken from open sources available on the internet and in libraries.

Research Questions:

- i. What is the background of the early October 2023 broke-out war between Israel and Hamas?
- ii. How a Palestinian Renaissance and establishing a Novel Political Structure after Israel's Operation in Gaza can be made possible?

Analytical Findings and Discussion

The Biden administration's optimistic outlook is probably going to encounter some harsh realities. First off, nobody knows how long this war will go, how much of Gaza will be left once the fighting finishes, or even how many Gazans there are. Furthermore, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that his country would not permit the PA to reenter Gaza (Bar'el, 2023) and has pledged to maintain Israeli soldiers there permanently. Additionally, he has revealed intentions to create a buffer zone within Gaza permanently, which would further limit the amount of land that Palestinians are allowed to possess. He has given his coalition partners assurances that no leader can stop the establishment of an independent state for the Palestinian people (Bar'el, 2023).

Things are already going in a bad direction on the ground. It is hard to imagine how much death and devastation there has been in Gaza. The Israeli attack has killed at least 18,800 people so far, largely civilians, including 8,200 children, according to Gaza's health ministry (Al-Jazeera, 2023). In addition to uprooting almost 80% of Gaza's 2.3 million residents, the operation has made a large portion of the northern Gaza region unusable (Massoud & Ibraheem, 2023). Israel's harsh restrictions on the people of Gaza's access to fuel, food, and water have resulted in widespread outbreaks of hunger and disease (Human Rights Watch, 2023), what the UN has called "an epic humanitarian catastrophe, and even warnings from UN representatives and other observers about the possibility of genocide" (Nichols, 2023). Furthermore, the likelihood that some or all of Gaza's vulnerable citizens will be forced to cross into Egypt is increasing daily as a result of the weaponization of disease and mass starvation, the nearly total collapse of the health care system in Gaza, and the ongoing bombardment of a populace squished

into ever-tinier spaces (Farge, 2023). A similar result would be in line with Netanyahu's wish to see a demographic decline in Gaza (Grim, 2023).

Gaza's destiny will be determined not just by Israeli-imposed circumstances on the ground but also by changes in Palestinian domestic politics. According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Palestinians must be at the forefront of discussions over Gaza's future (Elgindy, 2023). But for this to occur, Palestinians must restore not only the security and governance institutions but also, and perhaps more importantly, the political system (Said, 1992). This is because the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the umbrella group that purports to represent the various factions within the Palestinian national movement, have decayed and are thus lacking effective political leadership (Sayigh, 2023).

The division and paralysis that have afflicted Palestinian political institutions over the past sixteen years have had terrible effects on Israelis and Palestinians alike (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015). Indeed, the crippling division between Hamas and Fatah, the two main Palestinian political organizations that fought over Gaza in 2007 (Brown, 2010), had become a constant source of violence and instability, as many observers had long warned. While a significant portion of the political dysfunction in Palestine was self-inflicted, Israel has deliberately attempted to sow discord and fragility among Palestinians to sustain its indefinite authority over the occupied territories (Benhabib, 2023). Netanyahu's misguided belief that supporting Hamas in Gaza would avert a two-state solution (The Economist, 2023) later summed up this divide-and-rule strategy towards the Palestinians. That policy ended on October 7th as a result of the occurrences. War in Gaza has once again led to talk of peace, which may seem far-fetched, given the massacre of more than 1,200 Israelis on October 7th and the subsequent killing of some 16,000 Palestinians during the Israeli assault on Gaza (Massoud & Ibraheem, 2023). The Holy Land has not seen this much bloodshed since Israel was founded in 1948. Peace has never seemed so far away.

Therefore, the foundation for any discussion about the day after should be fostering the formation of a coherent and unified Palestinian political leadership. It will be necessary for Palestinian leaders to abandon their factional allegiances (Tartir, 2018), and for Israel and the US to give up the completely unfeasible notion that Hamas can be permanently eliminated from Palestinian politics (Schaer, 2023). It will be difficult to persuade the Palestinians or Israel and its American friends to do so. However, if they do not agree to these concessions, the security and humanitarian situation in Gaza is not going to get better, and a diplomatic solution will stay a long way off.

The events that have taken place in Gaza since October 7 are historic and comparable to other catastrophic events in Palestinian history (Pappe, 2022; Karsh, 2010), such as the 1948 *nakba*, meaning calamity, in which 800,000 Palestinians—roughly two-thirds of the Arab population living in British Mandatory Palestine—were forced from their homes or fled, with no way to return (Llewellyn & Llewellyn, 2022); and the 1967 Six-Day War, or *naksa*, meaning setback or defeat, in which Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the last remaining areas of historic Palestine, and another 300,000 Palestinians were forced to flee or leave their homes (Tahhan, 2018). Similar to 1948 and 1967, the ongoing conflict in Gaza is probably going to change the course of Palestinian politics in unpredictable ways.

The current attack on Gaza has already resulted in the greatest number of Palestinian forced displacements in history (Pappe, 2022; Karsh, 2010) as well as the bloodiest single incident. The Palestinian national psyche will be permanently altered for centuries to come by Israel's massive destruction of Gaza, just as Israelis will be affected for years to come by the awful attack carried out by Hamas on October 7. Similar to the *nakba*, Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Israel, the diaspora, and even farther afield throughout the Arab world are

experiencing the collective trauma of Gaza today, which will influence the political consciousness of the upcoming generation of Palestinian leaders.

Meanwhile, Israel's declared aim of dismantling Hamas as a political and military entity is unachievable and, a prescription for unending death and devastation. This is a painful but inevitable fact. It will be to everyone's benefit if Israeli and American leaders accept this truth as soon as possible. Even after two months of intense bombing and the destruction of most of Gaza's civilian infrastructure, Hamas could not be dislodged, or its military capabilities, its capacity to launch rockets, and its command and control networks could be seriously impaired (Najjar & Stepansky, 2023). Although it was short-lived, the hostages-for-prisoners agreement showed how relevant Hamas is (Masoud & Lubell, 2023), and Israel was forced to deal with the organization. According to a new analysis published in +972 Magazines, there is evidence to support the claim that Israel is purposefully causing widespread suffering and deaths among civilians in Gaza to turn them against Hamas. It is more likely that the Israeli invasion and bombing of Gaza have had the opposite impact, pushing a large number of Palestinians towards Hamas, as indicated by recent surveys by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research. (*Public Opinion Poll No (87) / PCPSR*, n. d.).

With large support both inside and beyond the occupied areas, Hamas is a vital part of Palestinian politics with strong societal roots. For the foreseeable future, Hamas is likely to continue playing a role in Palestinian politics, despite the disgusting nature of some of its ideals and acts. Furthermore, Hamas or a similar group will continue to engage in armed resistance in Gaza as long as the conditions of occupation, embargo, and other structural aggression by Israel exist there.

It is absurd to think that Hamas's enemies in the PA can just storm into Gaza and seize control of the region, given the group's resilience among other things. It seems doubtful that the PA—at least not in its current form—will return to Gaza anytime soon, whatever the wishes of the US and other Western countries. The government led by Netanyahu has likewise categorically denied such a notion (The New Arab Staff & Agencies, 2023). The PA views the prospect of restoring sovereignty over the damaged land as a poisoned chalice, even if Israeli authorities are persuaded to reconsider (Khalil, 2015). Not even PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who is incredibly weak and unpopular, wants to be seen capturing Gaza on the back of Israeli tanks. According to him, the PA won't go back to Gaza unless a clear route to Palestinian statehood is created (NEWS WIRES, 2023).

That is still extremely unlikely, considering the far-right government in Israel, which has expressed support for the complete annexation of the Palestinian territories, and the Biden administration's history in the region, which includes its unwillingness to apply pressure on Israel. Furthermore, the PA is collapsing slowly and is unable to govern the small territory (Leifer, 2023) it still has, and Abbas does not want to take on the enormous security and humanitarian issues brought on by Israel's demolition of Gaza (Awsat, 2023). Given that Gazan Palestinians are unlikely to be excited about adopting Abbas's dishonest and incompetent administration, the sentiment is probably reciprocal. In the end, any restoration of PA would still need Hamas's approval because of Abbas's extreme unpopularity and Hamas's unavoidable presence in the region.

Many inside and outside of Palestine believe that fresh elections, which haven't been conducted since 2006, are essential to the postwar order and the ultimate restoration of Gaza (Nassar, 2023), given the existing Palestinian leadership's waning credibility. However, the likelihood of a vote is quite low. The Israeli assault on Gaza has resulted in widespread misery, devastation, and disruption. These circumstances are probably going to last for a while. Elections just could not occur under these circumstances and there's the age-old, inescapable question of

whether Hamas would be permitted to take part (Cattan, 2022). It is nearly hard to envisage a scenario in which the US or Israel will let even a reformed Hamas run in elections in the future. Still, Hamas would lose credibility from an election process that specifically excluded it, and it may even spark a new civil war. In other words, although it is very difficult to envision Palestinian politics moving ahead with Hamas, it is also impossible to do so without it.

Conclusion

The paper tried to find answers to the following research questions:

- i. What is the background of the early October 2023 broke-out war between Israel and Hamas?
- ii. How a Palestinian Renaissance and establishing a Novel Political Structure after Israel's Operation in Gaza can be made possible?

After a detailed analysis of the situation of the Palestine and Israel conflict, the following were the concluded answers to the research questions:

Research Question No. 1:

The conflict between Israel and Hamas in early October 2023 erupted due to escalating tensions and violence between the two parties. It's part of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has deep-rooted historical, political, and territorial dimensions. Specific triggers for the outbreak of violence can vary, including issues related to land disputes, religious sites, security concerns, and the broader geopolitical landscape in the region. In the case of the October 2023 conflict, there could have been several contributing factors leading to the escalation of tensions. These might include:

- i. **Jerusalem Tensions:** Jerusalem, with its religious significance to both Jews and Muslims, often becomes a focal point of tension. Disputes over access to religious sites, such as the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, can ignite violence and protests.
- ii. **Settlement Expansion:** Israel's continued expansion of settlements in the occupied territories, which are considered illegal under international law, frequently sparks outrage among Palestinians and draws condemnation from the international community.
- iii. **Rocket Attacks and Retaliation:** Periodic rocket attacks launched from Gaza by Hamas and other militant groups, targeting Israeli civilian areas, prompt Israeli military responses. These exchanges of fire can quickly escalate into full-scale conflicts.
- iv. **Political Dynamics:** Internal political dynamics within Israel and Palestinian territories, as well as broader regional dynamics involving neighbouring countries like Egypt and Iran, can influence the level of tensions and the likelihood of conflict.
- v. **Failed Negotiations:** Breakdowns in peace negotiations or perceived lack of progress toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can lead to frustration and disillusionment among both populations, potentially fueling violence.

- vi. **Economic and Humanitarian Conditions:** Socio-economic disparities, lack of access to basic services, and restrictions on movement imposed by Israeli security measures contribute to the grievances of Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank, creating conditions ripe for unrest.

A Palestinian Renaissance and the establishment of a novel political structure after Israel's operation in Gaza would require a multi-faceted approach addressing various aspects of Palestinian society, governance, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here are some potential steps:

- i. **Political Reconciliation:** Palestinians would need to unite behind a common vision for their future, transcending factional divides between Fatah and Hamas. Reconciliation efforts should focus on forming a unified government that represents all Palestinians and can negotiate effectively with Israel.
- ii. **International Support:** The international community, including regional powers, should provide diplomatic, financial, and logistical support for Palestinian state-building efforts. This support could include economic aid, infrastructure development, and assistance in building democratic institutions.
- iii. **Nonviolent Resistance:** Emphasizing nonviolent resistance strategies, such as peaceful protests, civil disobedience, and boycotts, can garner international sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause while highlighting the injustices of the Israeli occupation.
- iv. **Negotiations with Israel:** Palestinians should engage in meaningful negotiations with Israel to reach a comprehensive peace agreement based on the two-state solution, with borders based on the pre-1967 lines and East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state.
- v. **Building Institutions:** Palestinians need to build strong, transparent, and accountable political institutions capable of providing effective governance and delivering services to the population. This includes investing in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and economic development.
- vi. **Empowering Youth and Women:** Empowering marginalized groups, such as youth and women, in Palestinian society is crucial for building a more inclusive and dynamic political structure. Their participation in decision-making processes and leadership roles is essential for driving positive change.
- vii. **Regional Cooperation:** Strengthening ties with neighbouring Arab countries and fostering regional cooperation can provide additional support for Palestinian state-building efforts and enhance stability in the region.
- viii. **Cultural and Intellectual Revival:** Promoting Palestinian culture, heritage, and intellectual achievements can contribute to a sense of national identity and pride, fostering a cultural renaissance that transcends the challenges of occupation and conflict.
- ix. **Addressing Internal Challenges:** Addressing internal challenges, such as corruption, inequality, and governance issues, is essential for building a sustainable and resilient Palestinian state.
- x. **International Recognition:** Continued efforts to gain international recognition for Palestinian statehood can bolster the legitimacy of Palestinian institutions and strengthen their position in negotiations with Israel.

Overall, achieving a Palestinian Renaissance and establishing a novel political structure will require sustained commitment, leadership, and cooperation from Palestinians, regional actors, and the international community. It will also necessitate overcoming significant challenges and obstacles, but the potential benefits of peace, stability, and prosperity make it a goal worth pursuing.

Recommendations:

In the backdrop of analysis and discussion, the following is recommended:

- i. That fundamental dilemma can be resolved, but it will need thoughtful consideration and humility from all sides. Above all, Israeli and American authorities will have to accept that Hamas will continue to play a role in Palestinian politics in one way or another. Furthermore, they must give up the illusion that they can reshape Palestinian politics to fit Israeli, or American, political objectives. This illusion has contributed to the erosion of Palestinian leaders' internal credibility ever since the Oslo process started in 1993. It is equally important for Palestinian leaders of all stripes to put aside their local disagreements to confront the genuinely existential issues they are currently facing.
- ii. The disentanglement of the PA from the Palestine Liberation Organization is something that many Palestinians already realize is necessary to revitalize their politics. The PA was first established by the Oslo Accords as a temporary governing body monitoring the affairs of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, while the PLO is meant to be the official address of the Palestinian national movement that represents Palestinians worldwide. In the process, the PLO was dismantled in preparation for the creation of a Palestinian state, and its institutional and personnel resources were essentially absorbed into the PA. That state never materialized, and the PLO was marginalized and allowed to wither away while the PA emerged as the de facto centre of Palestinian politics. Therefore, the objective needs to be to undo this process by raising the PLO and lowering the PA while making the distinctions between them more obvious. The establishment of a technocratic administration that is accepted by all parties, including Hamas, but excludes members of any of them, can accomplish this division. A transitional administration should be in place until the Palestinian state is established, or until circumstances permit the holding of elections. This administration could collect foreign donor funding and operate as a service provider rather than a political organization because it would not include Hamas.
- iii. Decades of bloodshed and instability were made possible by Hamas's absence from Palestinian politics. The Oslo Accords and the realities of Israeli occupation have created arrangements that mean that Palestinian leaders and governors are not always the same, in contrast to most other political systems where these roles are typically filled by the same individuals. That distinction presents an opportunity. The PLO has to change to gain legitimacy and the support of the Palestinian people while also functioning as a viable political leadership for Palestine and stabilizing and rebuilding Gaza under a technocratic Palestinian government. It has to be expanded to include members of Palestinian civil society in the occupied territories and abroad, as well as Hamas and other groups that are

not currently under the PLO's purview. This fundamental framework has been presented in several Palestinian reconciliation accords since 2011, but it has never been put into practice because of Abbas's unwillingness to cede authority and the United States and Israel's unwillingness to acknowledge Hamas's political role.

- iv. Israel, the U.S. Congress, and others will undoubtedly not accept the idea of normalizing Hamas's presence within the PLO, although this response is unreasonable. Previously, Hamas's exclusion from Palestinian politics allowed it to play free resulting in years of violence and instability culminating on October 7. It is better to include Hamas in the Palestine National Council, the PLO's long-dormant parliament and the Executive Committee would serve to moderate the organization and restrict its independence. Decisions on war and peace, including what to do with Hamas's arsenal, would be made by the Palestinian people collectively and without interference from any one group. This will make reaching a diplomatic solution between Israel and the PLO more challenging, but it also increases the likelihood that the accord will last. In any event, just as Palestinians should be able to select which parties to field in Knesset elections, so too should the issue of who may or may not engage in Palestinian politics be immune to Israeli veto power. Unaffected by Israel and the US, whose coercive influence over the last three decades has contributed to the erosion of Palestinian leaders' legitimacy in the eyes of their people; a successful Palestinian leadership must be allowed to act according to Palestinian national needs and objectives.
- v. Palestinians have a terrible past, and they are well aware that awful things usually happen to them at the exact times when they lack reliable political leadership. This is undoubtedly one of those occasions, as the present Israeli leadership is well aware of. However, a flexible and incompetent Palestinian leadership has been extremely destabilizing to the area and damaging to hopes for a diplomatic settlement, even though it may benefit Israel's short-term objectives. Strong leadership is needed to meet the issues facing the Palestinian people, and Abbas is unable or unwilling to deliver it. While it is doubtful that Abbas will accept such changes on his own, important Arab powers like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia that have an interest in regional stability and the realization of Palestinian political ambitions can assist in guiding him in the right direction until more reliable leadership appears.
- vi. Without a united, genuine, and credible Palestinian leadership, it is hard to foresee any process of stabilization or reconstruction in Gaza. This calls for the PLO and Palestinian institutional politics to come back to life. For this to occur, the US and Israel in particular must give up the risky ideas that they can manipulate or engineer Palestinian politics to fit their own ideological or political requirements or that they can make peace with one group of Palestinians while fighting another. If the United States is not even ready to let Palestinians run their domestic politics, it is difficult to take seriously the verbal support that the US is giving to an independent Palestinian state. It will be difficult to normalize Hamas within the framework of revived Palestinian politics, but the alternatives—such as keeping up the pressure for Hamas's demise, trying to impose elections in a crisis-ridden and unstable environment, or trying to drag an unreliable and ineffectual PA to Gaza—will probably backfire as they have in the past.

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